In a highly classified move last March, President Joe Biden, re-evaluating current and future threats, revised US strategic nuclear guidance and did so without public notice. New York Times journalist David E. Sanger broke the story nearly six months after the president acted. This could have significant ramifications for US strategic posture and nuclear planning.
Nuclear Weapons Strategy Is Critical to National Security
In October 2023, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States issued its report on US capability “including nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure.” The most recent assessment concluded the United States “is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international status quo, by force, if necessary: a situation which the United States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared.” Consequently, in March, Biden adjusted the US Nuclear Employment Guidance to emphasize the rapid buildup of the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear weapons inventory and the missile systems to deliver them.
The Guidance is congressionally mandated to be adjusted every four years to take into account significant changes in the strategic threats the United States faces. As the NYT pointed out in the article “Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat,” the document is among the most sensitive classified information the government produces. “[T]here are no electronic copies, only a small number of hard copies distributed to a few national security officials and Pentagon commanders,” Sanger described. An unclassified version of the document for employing nuclear weapons will be delivered to Congress before Biden leaves office in January.
What makes the new Guidance different, the NYT account stated, is that it addresses the need for the United States to build its nuclear capability to deter a coordinated and simultaneous attack “from Russia, the PRC, and North Korea.” Pyongyang’s nuclear threat in the Indo-Pacific, along with its close mutual defense relationship with China and Russia, identifies the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as an adversary to be deterred and defeated. Even before the Nuclear Employment Guidance announcement, there were indications that the United States was changing its strategic nuclear position. A recent Liberty Nation News article explained, “Now, in August of 2024, the Pentagon is ‘considering options to increase the number of nuclear weapons launchers and warheads at its disposal,’ Breaking Defense reported.”
The Guidance is significant because it does not stand alone; it informs numerous national security strategic arms policies and guidance directives. There is a “deliberate and methodical” process called Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Planning, and the Nuclear Employment Guidance is the commander-in-chief’s direction as to threat priorities for the use of nuclear weapons. Among the key elements that make up Nuclear Planning Process objectives are target development, “weaponeering” assessment, force planning, and decision conferencing.
Deliberate Planning Process
Target development is the methodology whereby appropriate combatant commanders with specific global geographic responsibilities “nominate, vet, and select adversary strategic assets, facilities, and capabilities as targets.” Each target must represent a strategic value or adversary’s weakness that can be exploited with a nuclear weapon to achieve a military objective. Part of this analysis will assess a target’s vulnerability to a specific type of atomic weapon.
The “weaponeering” assessment evaluates the characteristics of the various nuclear systems, yield, and accuracy concerning the characteristics of the target. The objective would be to “delay, disrupt, disable, or destroy critical enemy forces or resources.” Other considerations include the enemy’s ability to re-establish and reconstitute its forces while avoiding collateral damage. Completing the target development and “weaponeering” assessment provides information necessary to achieve appropriate force planning, having the correct number of the right nuclear weapons to achieve the desired effect. Force planning “marks the shift in the overall process from analysis to operational planning.”
The number of appropriate atomic bombs or missile warheads in the US inventory and the effective platforms to deliver the weapons all figure into force planning. Integrating the use of these weapons into the conflict with an understanding of where friends and allies are operating is a key part of the process.
When the president elects to make major or even minor adjustments in the Nuclear Employment Guidance, it begins a cascade of analyses, capabilities assessments, planning, and operational re-planning. Consequently, turning the nuclear spotlight on China while considering a coordinated threat from Russia, China, and North Korea drives considerable rethinking of how nuclear weapons will be used and whether a nuclear response is the best action. It’s understandable why such guidance from the president is so well protected.
The views expressed are those of the author and not of any other affiliate.
