Every so often, someone will present a case disparaging the value of the US Navy's aircraft carriers. These attempts to persuade military leaders of more effective ways to project sea power generally pick up on some new weapon or threat to justify deep-sixing the backbone of the US force presence – the modern nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. So it is with economist Mr. Philip Pilkington's National Interest article "Why Aircraft Carriers Are Becoming Obsolete."
Few would deny the US Navy has come under scrutiny for its ability to field warships. However, the value of the formidable nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has not been high on the list for evaluation for warfighting value.
The new hypersonic, multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – Oreshnik – launched against Ukraine's PA Pivdenmash aerospace industry plant spread warheads over the expanse of the plant, approximate three square miles. Consequently, Pilkington argued, the missile is a game changer. Such a weapon puts US aircraft carriers at significant risk with the cost-benefit advantage going to the missile. As an alternative, the US should consider using the Lun-class Ekranoplan, or “ground effect vehicle” (GEV), a Cold War relic designed, tested, then rejected by the Soviet Union.
Take each of these elements of Pilkington's argument at a time. First, the Russian Oreshnik ICBM launch may not have been as devastatingly effective as first thought. Any ICBM with a Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) is a formidable weapon system. However, the Nov. 21 launch of an Oreshnik ‘super weapon' as Russian President Vladimir Putin menacingly calls the ICBM with its conventional warheads, may have been more bluster than bang. As the Daily Mail explained:
"Russia fired the nuclear-capable hypersonic missile at Dnipro in Ukraine on Nov. 21 in what was described as a combat test...The Moscow Times now reports that four Russian officials say the Oreshnik threat to Ukraine and the West was an 'orchestrated show' by the Putin regime – and that the weapon's imminent use to unleash major damage is almost impossible."
However, the missile is nuclear-capable, and that is not trivial. Still, it is not particularly noteworthy as a delivery system for conventional weapons. A Real Clear Defense account referring to a Russian report that revealed the warheads did not have explosives included to leave room for the test instruments to assess the launch vehicle's performance. "The report concludes that the missile attack was merely a warning to the West and quotes the director of the US government-funded Institute of International Studies in California derisively saying, 'I would say this is an incredibly expensive way to deliver what is probably not that much destruction,'" Real Clear Defense reported. Yet it is on the cost-benefit factors that Pilkington makes one of his arguments.
The relative cost case goes like this. The Oreshnik or similar ICBM costs about $40.3 million compared with a 1970s Nimitz-class aircraft carrier with a price tag of $11.2 billion in 2023 dollars. Consequently, Pilkington concludes that the Russians could build "between 154 and 278 Oreshnik missiles" for each aircraft carrier built by the US. "If the Russians had to fire off fifty Oreshniks to hit a single aircraft carrier, the cost would be well worth it," the author says. The assumption is that of the multiple warheads heading toward a carrier, one or more would hit it. However, that assumption does not account for the demonstrated capability of the fleet air defense, which includes an array of anti-missile cruisers and destroyers in the carrier task force – additionally, damage control on modern aircraft carriers is designed to absorb enemy attacks. When making cost comparisons, it's useful to use an effects-based calculus. There are two basic considerations when looking at MIRVed warheads. Are they indeed targeted at geographically displaced targets or at an aircraft carrier, a single point in the ocean? Despite the speed differential, "Mach 10 and Mach 11" of the missile versus 34.5 mph for the carrier, whatever the preplanned location entered into the missile guidance system is, the aircraft carrier on the move will not be there.
Lastly, Pilkington suggests that the US Navy explore the technology used in the Lun-class ground effect (GEV) vehicle development that the Soviet Union abandoned. In the YouTube video Pilkington provided with his article, the GEV looks formidable with its dorsally mounted missile and rocket launchers. But notice in the video Pilkington provided, the aircraft, although moving very fast, is traversing very calm water. A sea state with 10- to 15-foot waves would challenge the vehicle to keep its speed. Furthermore, these vehicles go very fast in a straight line, making rapid defensive evasion turns challenging. It's not an airplane. These two limitations make the Lun-class GEV problematic in an operational role. Additionally, even at a straight-line top speed of 342 mph, the vessel would be no match for the Navy's FA-18 E/F and F-35C Lightening II carrier-born fighter jets with long-range air-to-air missiles. These fighters with look-down, shoot-down radar capability would make easy work of the Lun-class vessel.
There may be a practical replacement for the modern aircraft carrier, but if there are, we haven’t found them yet. Neither have the Chinese, French, British, or Russians. So far, no one has figured out how to tow a runway, taxiways, and ramp space located on an island to where the conflict is anywhere in the world. Aircraft carriers are going to be with us for a while.
The views expressed are those of the author and not of any other affiliate.
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