Keeping the US Navy in fighting shape is no easy job. Now, according to a Congressional Budget Office analyst, the sea service is in its worst shape for turning out warships in a quarter century. China and Russia are taking more command of the sea lines of communication worldwide, and America cannot field warships that are on cost, on schedule, and perform to contract specifications in a timely fashion.
US Navy Faces Challenges with Shipbuilding
The sad state of the US naval capability to field combat-worthy vessels is not something that happened overnight. More troubling, the same problems plaguing the Navy are equally represented in other military services. However, the Navy shipbuilding program has recently taken center stage because its launching of new, more capable US warships has not kept up with the threats posed by America's adversaries. So, what exactly is the problem?
In the US defense acquisition system, with "system" writ large, there are three elements: the acquisition process, the budget process, and the requirements determination process. "Much of the blame for US shipbuilding's current woes lies with the Navy, which frequently changes requirements, requests upgrades, and tweaks designs after shipbuilders have begun construction," according to the Associated Press assessment of culpability. All too often, the Navy determines that some new threat creates a new requirement, leading to demands for changes often before the ink is even dry on the award contracts.
Over the years – and sometimes even decades – that it takes for a new ship program to be ready for action, America’s enemies may have fielded numerous naval weapon systems. This leaves the US Navy warship program without the decided advantage desired when the program began. Consequently, what is called "requirements creep" drives the program.
The AP assertion that "current woes lies [sic] with the Navy," albeit accurate in a macro sense, is not precise. The US Navy is not a person; it is an institution – and institutions aren't culpable. People are. Institutions don't lead or manage. People do. Whether the requirements for a warship are appropriate to address a threat is a determination made by US Navy requirements managers: people.
One measure of the Navy's capability to meet mission requirements over 25 years is to simply look back. In 2000, there were 318 battle force ships in the US Navy. Now there are only 296. However, there are better metrics for looking at the capability the Navy needs in the future. "The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated missions; the 296-ship fleet of May 2024 may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions," the Congressional Research Service (CRS) observed.
Yet, regardless of requirements, budget constraints, or the acquisition process, if there is an insufficiently skilled workforce to build ships, warship production will flounder. It was the point CBO naval analyst Eric Labs made when he said shipbuilding is in “a terrible state.” He continued: “I feel alarmed . . . I don't see a fast, easy way to get out of this problem. It's taken us a long time to get into it.” There is a shortage of experienced and skilled labor across the range of jobs needed to build modern US warships. Labor shortages lead to backlogs in turning out the naval vessels. Backlogs increase the time it takes to put a US battle force at sea, which drives up costs.
Shipbuilding Plan Hits Heavy Seas
The CBO's analysis reveals that cost overruns for the current production lines run from $857 million, 15% cost growth for the Virginia Class attack submarine on the high side, to $10 million, 22% cost growth for the Najavo salvage and rescue vessel. The report explains that the "delivery times of the new ships in [the Navy’s] plan are predicated on the assumption that the production delays plaguing several shipyards today will be resolved, leading to the steady and on-time delivery of new ships in the future." Such optimism has historically proved fleeting.
In addition to workforce problems, fundamental industrial base issues are stumbling blocks to an efficient US Navy shipbuilding program. As evidence of the misplaced optimism mentioned above, "Several of the US Navy's top shipbuilding programs are running one year to three years behind schedule, as the service and the industrial base grapple with workforce and management challenges," Defense News explained in an April 2024 article.
Realizing their hopes of getting warships into the operational fleets on time were fading, Navy officials conducted a 45-day assessment of naval shipbuilding. The review showed, among other revelations, that "the Navy's Block IV Virginia submarines, which were bought from fiscal 2014 to 2018, are running 36 months behind schedule. The attack submarines rely on the same shipbuilders and suppliers as the Columbia [Class submarine] program, but they've taken the brunt of the delays to keep Columbia on track," Defense News observed.
Pentagon leadership at the Department of Defense level has been slow to grasp and deal effectively with defense industrial base issues. The anemic National Defense Industrial Strategy released in February 2024 "falls short of being a strategy. At best it's a list of concerns with little in the way of actionable goals," Liberty Nation News reported. Getting the US Navy battle force production capable of meeting America's wartime needs is not trivial. It takes leadership, management skills, a qualified workforce, and an industrial base to support a gigantic defense manufacturing complex. It’s a tough task, and it isn’t getting any easier.
The views expressed are those of the author and not of any other affiliate.
