The term “Pentagon Culture” is often overheard in conversations about the Department of Defense (DOD). It’s a phrase that attempts to describe the unique behavior of individuals working in the Five-sided Building on the Potomac. The assumption is that because national security is the primary objective of decision-makers employed at the DOD, the behavior would be uniformly characteristic. That would be decidedly inaccurate. There are four distinct cultures.
President-elect Trump Will Meet Resistance in the Pentagon
Few will argue that President-elect Donald Trump will not encounter resistance to his agenda. Entrenched bureaucrats are a force to be reckoned with when change is on the agenda. With the incoming administration, change is not just on the agenda, it is the agenda. The Daily Signal called out the State Department as an example of one agency that will have its share of obstructionist and holdover ideologues. “State Department bureaucrats are likely to show ‘inherent resistance’ to whoever Trump names to the job, said Victoria Coates, vice president of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation.” But perhaps a more complicated nut to crack will be the Pentagon culture – or more accurately the Pentagon cultures, plural.
To be sure, Pentagon employees do not wake up each morning wondering how they can screw up the Department of Defense. The vast population of the Pentagon community are dedicated and tireless workers. Each wants to support performance excellence for the warfighters in the field. What ends up getting in the way is that the Department of Defense workforce is a product of not one but four unique, often cooperative but also competitive, cultures or cultural points of view. To work effectively in the Pentagon, the incoming Trump cadre should know something about these cultures and why they behave as they do.
The first is the perspective of the uniform military. They are task-oriented and focus on an end state that can be accomplished efficiently. If given the opportunity and clear direction, the uniformed military in the Pentagon are self-starters and can be counted on to get the job done. However, it is a hierarchical and fiercely autocratic culture. Consequently, the uniformed military culture tends to be driven by regulations and directives. Following rules is not a bad thing until interpretation of those rules obstructs the president’s agenda. When it comes to interpretation, the highest level of civilian authority wins.
The second is the civilian career professional culture. This culture is process oriented. However, their decision-making and input are generally based on what has been done in the past. The civilian employee is essential, even indispensable, because this cadre of defense employees represents continuity and a bulwark against thinking that dredges up initiatives that have failed in the past. They are strong advocates of what works consistently. They are dedicated and dependable. Unfortunately, this culture also tends to stifle innovative thinking and must be led and managed skillfully.
The third culture is the political appointee. These folks come into the Pentagon with a mission to accomplish the administration’s agenda. This motivation is particularly true with the Trump 47 team with a mandate for change. There is often a clash of cultures when the political appointees do not get how the Pentagon works and attempt to implement changes in the civilian and uniform military cultures without understanding why things work as they do. This is a fool’s errand. The challenge is for the political appointee at every level to have appropriate leadership and management skills to persuade the military and civilian workforce to accomplish the administration’s agenda and have the military and civilian workforce convinced it was their idea. That is not easy, but understanding how the Pentagon functions makes meeting the challenge more likely and less frustrating.
There Is a Fourth Culture That Might Not Be Considered
The fourth culture is a ubiquitous and commanding presence – the aerospace and defense industry. Industry profit-loss requirements drive the military market and consequently also drive the behaviors of the other three cultures. Never forget the maxim, “It’s about the money. It’s always about the money.” The industry will do anything it is asked to do. How the aerospace and defense industry is asked to support the warfighter is through the structured acquisition system – procuring weapons, systems, and services. Clarity in defining a requirement provided to the industry prompts the competitive acquisition system to go into action. However, in the absence of a defined warfighter need or identified course of action, the defense industry will produce one. The relationship between the Defense Department and the defense industrial base must be managed and incentivized. Doing both of those things simultaneously is achieving the miraculous.
An additional point of view that is not as obvious is the contract employee, though whether this represents a unique culture is debatable. Generally, the civilian contractor simply parrots which ever culture employs them. When these employees begin to exert independence, it is problematic. They are not part of the decision-making team and should not be given the opportunity to act like they are.
Over the last four years, there has been an erosion of purpose in the Pentagon. Focusing on social justice concerns and other goals that do not support warfighting imperatives has reduced the readiness and combat capability of the US Armed Forces. Finding ways to return the momentum of the daily Pentagon activities to the essentials of national security will be a challenge. Understanding the cultural points of view, however, will be helpful.
