How does the Department of Defense go shopping? It consults a “catalogue” of sorts, filled with Defense Industrial Base (DIB) suppliers, approved for-profit commercial firms, nonprofit research centers, university laboratories, and government-owned industrial facilities. There the government can buy everything from “large, technologically sophisticated weapon systems and highly specialized operational support to general commercial products and routine services,” according to Congress.gov. But a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report revealed some blind spots in the process that could pose danger to US national security.
The GAO found there is often little transparency into these suppliers and the sources from which they obtain parts and raw materials. Critical components could even be purchased from adversaries like China. With more than 200,000 subcontractors providing parts and subassemblies, it is essential to eliminate risks to prevent supply chain compromise.
Opaque Resources in the Defense Industrial Base Are Troubling
Historically, the weak link in America’s ability to secure its domestic and international supply chains has been sabotage, robbery, counterfeiting, and intellectual property theft. Particularly perilous is the potential for China and other US adversaries to ban sales of raw materials or microelectronics to the United States and disrupt American commerce. For example, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) supplies 94% of the world’s gallium, essential for the manufacture of semiconductors, lasers, and magnets needed for such defense technologies as radar systems. The PRC banned the export of gallium to the United States in December 2024.










